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Abstract 
We analyze empirically the coalition formation of local governments using a novel reduced 
form econometric procedure that allows for multi-partner mergers. Using Finnish municipal 
merger data where mergers were decided independently at the local level, we find that merger 
decisions are largely in line with voter preferences. Most importantly, mergers are clearly less 
likely when the distance of the median voter to the coalition centre is large. However, 
councillors seem also to prefer mergers where post-merger political competition is lower 
which indicates a concern for re-election. Interestingly, municipalities do not seem to be 
seeking economies of scale through merging. This is possibly due to existing cooperation in 
service production which we find to be a strong predictor of merging. 
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JEL Classifications: H77, H72, C35  
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1   Introduction 
 
The formation and dissolution of nations and local jurisdictions like school districts, 
municipalities or counties, agreeing on political coalitions, deciding memberships in 
international cooperative organizations like the UN and WTO and even corporate mergers are 
all examples of coalition formation. Both history and recent news are full of examples that 
highlight the practical importance of understanding the mechanisms that, for example, draw 
the borders between nations. Both the formation and dissolution of Soviet Union is an 
example of large scale coalition formation and in Belgium the question whether it should be 
one or two nations is always bubbling under. Due to its significant economic and political 
importance, coalition formation has attracted interest from both policy makers and theoretical 
and empirical researchers. The main questions in this literature are how many and what type 
of coalitions should be optimally formed and how is the optimal distribution of coalitions 
achieved. 
There is a long tradition of economic research concerning local governments. The vast 
literature on fiscal federalism has concentrated on the question of assignment of functions and 
taxes to different levels of government.1 According to Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), in 
the absence of scale benefits in the provision of public goods and interjurisdictional 
spillovers, decision making should be decentralized so that public good provision can be 
matched to heterogeneous preferences of the population. A related result due to Tiebout 
(1956) offers decentralization as a tool for efficient pricing of local public goods in a world 
where mobile households shop for a suitable tax and public good combination offered by 
endogenously and optimally formed local jurisdictions.2 However, these strands of literature 
leave open the issue of where and through what process local governments or jurisdictions 
arise in the first place.  
Later work on endogenous mergers and coalition formation by e.g. Miceli (1993), 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and Bolton and Roland (1997) also emphasize the 
fundamental trade-off between economies of scale in the production of public goods (which 
favors merging) and regional heterogeneity in preferences (which favors separation).3 This 
trade-off determines the optimal size of a given coalition. These studies add to the earlier 
                                                 
1 See Oates (1999) for an overview of this literature. 
2 See Boadway and Tremblay (2011) for a recent review of the Tiebout model and the subsequent literature. 
3 Dur and Staal (2008) analyze theoretically the role of national transfers in municipal merging.  
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fiscal federalism literature by introducing a political economy model of coalition formation. 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland (1997) and Ellingsen (1998) discuss how 
politics may cause departures from welfare maximizing coalition formation. For example, 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) show that the equilibrium under within jurisdiction majority 
voting is suboptimal to the one achieved under a global social planner.  
Empirical contributions to this field are more recent mainly because econometric 
modeling of spatial merger decisions is complicated for a number of reasons elaborated later 
on. Brasington (1999, 2003a, 2003b), Gordon and Knight (2009) and Weese (2011) use 
different methods but are all fundamentally concerned with optimal coalition formation and 
the characteristics of optimal coalitions in terms of economies scale and preference 
heterogeneity. Gordon and Knight (2009) and Weese (2011) have proposed structural 
econometric methods to analyze spatial mergers. All of the existing empirical work abstracts 
away from a number of interesting political economy questions, such as legislative bargaining 
and political agency issues.4 Furthermore, existing structural methods cannot utilize natural 
experiments for causal inference.  
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways by analyzing a recent surge 
of municipality mergers in Finland. First, we introduce a reduced form econometric procedure 
that allows us to analyze multi-partner mergers and to use standard causal inference tools. 
Unlike the existing structural methods, this framework also allows for a large set of covariates 
and statistical inference with a relatively small amount of actual mergers. In a merger 
analysis, we would like to compare the realized mergers to potential mergers that did not take 
place. Multi-partner mergers or one-to-many matching causes two related problems for this 
type of analysis. First, it is more difficult to define the set of potential coalitions that could 
have formed than it is in a one-to-one matching situation. Second, the number of potential 
coalitions that can be formed from the original municipal map is very large under most 
reasonable definitions. We solve these problems using Wernicke’s (2005) network detection 
algorithm which can be used to construct all the potential coalitions that can be formed from 
the original municipality map while maintaining spatial contiguity.5 We also illustrate how 
stratified choice based sampling can easily be incorporated to the analysis in situations where 
data collection or computational costs prohibit the use of the total population of potential 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Besley (2006). 
5 Weese (2011) also relies on Wernicke’s (2005) algorithm but in a different way. 
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coalitions, which in many cases can be substantive.6 This procedure has many attractive 
features that may be important for future coalition formation studies as well because statistical 
theory for choice based sampling is well developed and easy to apply. In our application, data 
collection is not costly with respect to our variables of interest, and thus, we are able to 
confirm that choice based sampling results are consistent with the results obtained using the 
full sample where we correct for rare events bias.  
Second, in addition to analyzing the usual determinants of coalition formation, such as 
economies of scale and heterogeneity, we provide the first empirical analysis of the role of 
local politics in merger decisions.7 This is possible because municipal councils made all the 
merger decisions in our data and we observe a number of interesting characteristics of 
municipalities and their councils. The most interesting aspects of our analysis in this respect 
are the role of the geographic location of the median voter in a potential coalition, which we 
can measure quite precisely using a GIS dataset produced by Statistics Finland, and political 
agency issues related to re-election, political competition and politicians’ private careers. The 
former can be seen as a measure of voter preferences over merging while the latter measures 
departure from optimality in coalition formation due to politicians’ self-interest. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a natural experiment for most of our explanatory variables. 
However, descriptive analysis of empirical regularities between political characteristics and 
merger decisions is novel and therefore interesting as such. Moreover, we can exploit 
exogenous variation in municipal council size to study the causal effect of political career 
prospects on merger decisions using regression discontinuity design (RDD). However, the 
conclusions from the RDD analysis are limited due to simultaneous treatments at the council 
size thresholds. 
Our main result is that measures of voter preferences are the main determinants of 
coalition formation. Most importantly, the likelihood of merging clearly diminishes as the 
distance of the median voter to the coalition centre increases. Moreover, more homogenous 
coalitions in terms of expenditures are more likely to form. However, the local political 
environment also plays a role. Councilors seem to decide the mergers consistently with 
                                                 
6 For example, some research questions may require conducting surveys on voter sentiments about various 
potential coalitions. Such a survey would not be feasible if these voters would have to compare thousands of 
different potential coalitions.  
7 To our knowledge, only Austin (1999) attempts to look at the political decision making process behind 
coalition formation. He studies one-sided suburban annexation decisions of US cities in 1950’s. However, his 
variables that measure ‘politics’ are just measures of population’s race, income and tax rate, whereas we observe 
the actual characteristics of local politicians. 
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political agency models, potentially indicating concerns over political career. Another 
interesting observation is that scale economies do not seem to be important. Overall, our 
results suggest that future theoretical merger analysis should incorporate political agency 
aspects.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a more detailed 
description of Finnish municipalities and the institutional background for municipality 
mergers. In Section 3, we describe our econometric method. Section 4 presents the data and 
Section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2   Institutional background 
 
Local governments play an important role in the economies of many countries. This is 
especially true in the Nordic countries like Finland where there has been a long tradition of 
decentralized political decision making. In Finland, public goods and services are provided by 
two tiers of government where municipalities constitute the local level.8 Because of the 
variety of tasks assigned to them, municipalities are of considerable importance to the whole 
economy. The GDP share of municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ 
around 20 percent of the total workforce. The bulk of Finnish municipalities’ expenditures 
come from producing welfare services with a strong redistributive character, such as social 
and health care services and primary education. Municipalities fund their spending mostly 
through their own revenue sources. The most important revenue source is the flat municipal 
income tax which the municipalities can set freely. However, an extensive central government 
grant system is used to equalize local cost and revenue disparities. The grant system covers 20 
percent of total municipal spending, but for every fourth municipality the grant system covers 
more than 50 percent of their revenues. Furthermore, cooperation in service production is 
quite common among municipalities, especially in health care.9  
Another important feature of the Finnish system is the large number of municipalities 
relative to population with a large variation in municipal population size. The largest 
municipality is the country’s capital, Helsinki, with almost 600,000 inhabitants, whereas the 
                                                 
8 See Moisio et al. (2010) for details. 
9 Usually cooperation takes place through a joint authority. Joint authorities are independent legal entities 
governed by municipal legislation. They are financed by selling their services to municipalities. The most 
important joint authorities are hospital districts and basic health care. Membership is voluntary, except that every 
municipality has to belong to a hospital district.  
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smallest mainland municipality, Suomenniemi, has roughly 800 inhabitants. The median 
municipal population size is less than 6,000. Despite the size differences, all municipalities 
have the same responsibilities. Finland is also sparsely populated and population density 
varies a great deal between municipalities, as do other population characteristics such as age 
structure and income.  
The number of municipalities in Finland has diminished considerable since the 1940’s 
as can be seen from Figure 1. The reduction in the number of municipalities in the 1940’s was 
due to losing land areas to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. There have been 
two major merger waves.  In the 1960’s almost all and in the 2000’s all of the mergers have 
been voluntary. Besides the two merger waves, municipality structure has been quite stable 
through time.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of municipalities in Finland, 1917–2010. 
 
What explains the latest drop in the number of municipalities? Some recent 
developments in Finland have changed the operating environment of municipalities. A major 
recession in the early 1990s hit different regions with a different force due to differences in 
industrial composition. The subsequent recovery was regionally uneven and regional 
disparities started to grow.  Furthermore, population aging continues to challenge municipal 
finance in the future because a bulk of municipal expenditures is related to health and elderly 
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care. The central government reacted to these concerns in 2005 by initiating a plan that aimed 
at reforming municipal revenue structure and more importantly making the production of 
statutory municipal services more efficient. In 2007 these goals were made concrete by a 
provisional law where the main tool for strengthening the operating environment of 
municipalities was municipality mergers. The law clearly states that municipalities should 
have strong enough revenue and labor force bases to cope with the production of statutory 
public services. According to the law, merging is voluntary and a given merger takes place if 
it gains the majority vote in all the individual municipality councils contemplating the merger. 
However, the government initiated a new subsidy scheme to encourage merger activity that 
applies to mergers taking place from 2008 onwards.10 In addition to the subsidy, the 
government guarantees that central government grants are not reduced for five years after the 
merger even if the new municipality is entitled to a smaller overall grant than the merging 
municipalities individually. The central government also guaranteed that municipal 
employees would not lose their jobs for five years after a merger.11  
Finnish Municipalities are governed by councils that have all the decision making 
power and decisions are based on simple councilor majority.12 This is true for merging as 
well. Municipal councils are elected every four years using open list elections that apply the 
D’Hondt method. Finland has a multi-party system and currently there are eight parties in the 
Finnish parliament and these parties also dominate municipal politics. In the 2004 municipal 
elections the three largest parties (the Centre Party, the Social Democrats and the National 
Coalition) received roughly 68 percent of the votes with roughly similar shares. In addition to 
the traditional left- and right-wing division (the Social Democrats and the National Coalition), 
a somewhat peculiar feature of the Finnish political landscape is the strong support for the 
Centre Party (formerly known as the Agrarian League). The role of the Centre Party is 
                                                 
10 The subsidy scheme consists of two parts. The basic part is determined according to the population of the new 
coalition and the combined population of the participating municipalities except the largest municipality. An 
additional supplement is paid if the number of municipalities diminishes at least by two and increases as the 
number of disappearing municipalities increase. The subsidy scheme would potentially allow for RDD to study 
its effects on merging. Unfortunately, we do not have enough realized mergers sufficiently near any population 
thresholds of the subsidy system to plausibly identify causal effects. 
11 This has been applied in practice. For example, a typical merger of three municipalities has three persons 
receiving a city manager’s salary for five years. 
12 The council also chooses the municipal executive board that consists of councilors. The composition of the 
board is based on party shares in the council, i.e. each party in the council get seats in the municipal board 
according to their share of council seats. Mayors or city managers are not elected officials but civil servants and 
are of relatively small importance in Finland, but the board plays an important preparatory role in the municipal 
decision making, including the merger process. See Moisio et al. (2010) for more details on municipal politics.  
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important in municipality mergers also because they have clearly opposed forced mergers 
implemented by the central government, whereas the Social Democrats and the National 
Coalition have been more open to a larger role of the central government in merger decisions.  
Each municipality has only one electoral district and no quotas are in place. This goes 
also for the merged coalitions. Council size is a step function of a municipality’s population 
and is determined by law. The council size varies from 13, for municipalities with population 
2,000 or less, up to 85 for municipalities with population 400,000 or more.13 Thus, in case of 
a merger of a very large municipality and a very small municipality, it is likely that all the 
council members in the new coalition will be residents of the former larger municipality. Also 
the size of the candidate list for each party in elections is a deterministic function of council 
size since the maximum number of candidates per party is equal to 1.5*(council size). Thus, 
mergers also reduce the number of candidates and influence political competition in the next 
elections.  
 
3   Econometric modeling of spatial mergers 
3.1   Existing methods 
 
Econometric modeling of spatial merger decisions is complicated for a number of reasons. 
First, merger decision making is two-sided in the sense that we observe a merger only if all 
potential merger parties agree to merge. Second, each municipality faces multiple potential 
merging partners but can merge only once during a given period. It is challenging both to 
account for all the potential merger partners and to restrict the sum of the probabilities of all 
the potential mergers to one. Third, municipal merger choices are spatially interdependent so 
that a merger between two or more municipalities changes the choice set of adjacent 
municipalities. Finally, there is the possibility of one-to-many matching, meaning that 
coalitions consisting of more than two municipalities are possible. This means that the 
number of potential merger partners and coalitions may be very large and it may be difficult 
and costly to collect the relevant data.  
There are three estimators in the literature that account for some or all of these features. 
First, Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit model with partial observability can accommodate for 
                                                 
13 The council sizes for different populations are the following: population less or equal to 2000 (council size 13, 
15 or 17), 2001–4000 (21), 4001–8000 (27), 8001–15,000 (35), 15,001–30,000 (43), 30,001–60,000 (51), 
60,001–120,000 (59), 120,001–250,000 (67), 250,001–400,000 (75) and over 400,000 (85). 
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the two-sided decision making, but not the other features. This approach has been used by 
Brasington (1999, 2003a and 2003b) in his analysis of school district mergers in the U.S. 
Second, the matching estimator using simulated method of moments proposed by Gordon and 
Knight (2009) takes into account two-sided decision making, spatial interdependence and 
multiple potential partners but does not allow for one-to-many matching. Mergers including 
multiple municipalities are a prominent feature of our data which makes the Gordon and 
Knight’s estimator infeasible in our case. Gordon and Knight (2009) also apply their estimator 
to school district mergers in the U.S. Third, Weese (2011) introduces a method of estimating 
the structural parameters of a political coalition formation game based on simulated maximum 
likelihood. Weese’s estimator allows for all the above features including one-to-many 
matching, which is accomplished with the application of Wernicke’s (2005) network 
algorithm. Weese (2011) applies his method to municipality mergers in Japan.14 Due to 
computational reasons, a number of potentially important factors contributing to merger 
decisions are left out in both Gordon and Knight’s (2009) and Weese’s (2011) empirical 
applications. Moreover, the underlying theoretical models in these studies abstract away from 
political economy type questions, since they are based on maximizing utility functions of 
coalitions or individual jurisdictions (or populations of coalitions). For these two reasons, 
municipal council characteristics cannot be easily included in their method.  
 
3.2   Our procedure 
 
Since one of our main contributions is a rich set of interesting explanatory variables, we will 
not estimate a computationally cumbersome structural model. Nonetheless, we can account 
for most of the econometric problems raised earlier. We solve the first problem of two-sided 
decision making by analyzing coalition level data, which abstracts away from individual 
municipality choices.15 This choice imposes an assumption that only coalition level shocks 
                                                 
14 Alesina et al. (2004) also examine the number of political jurisdiction, such as school districts and 
municipalities, within counties in the U.S. In particular, they test whether a trade-off between economies of scale 
and population heterogeneity can explain the number and size of jurisdictions. However, they do not analyze 
actual merging decisions.  
15 In principle, we could also use the Poirier model, but analyzing multi-partner mergers with a bivariate model 
would require some unrealistic assumptions. Moreover, the Poirier model typically has bad convergence 
properties. For example, most of Brasington’s (1999, 2003a, 2003b) results are corner solutions to the maximum 
likelihood optimization problem. According to our tests, convergence is a major problem also in the Poirier 
analysis of our data. 
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are relevant or that all the merger parties value the merger in the same way.16 This may be a 
potential source of bias in our descriptive analysis, but should not matter for RDD analysis. 
Unfortunately, we are not able address the second problem of one municipality appearing in 
many potential coalitions in this paper, and thus, the estimated merger probabilities may be 
biased. We address the third problem of spatial interdependence by using data only from a 
single period of the coalition formation game. Assuming that the decision making is 
simultaneous, the choice set remains stable over our period of analysis. We address the fourth 
problem using Wernicke’s (2005) network detection algorithm. We also introduce a choice 
based sampling procedure that makes our empirical strategy feasible for a much larger set of 
questions and applications as elaborated below. We analyze both the full sample using rare 
events logit and the choice based sample using weighted logit analysis.  
The starting point of our procedure is to create a dataset to be analyzed, i.e. the potential 
coalitions that can be formed from the original municipality map before the mergers. In 
creating the set of potential coalitions, we follow Weese (2011) and utilize the network 
algorithm by Wernicke (2005), but in a slightly different way. Using the original municipal 
map, this algorithm can be used to create all the potential coalitions that could be formed 
while maintaining spatial contiguity. That is, algorithm takes into account geographic borders 
so that municipalities can form a coalition only if all of them share a geographic border. 
Naturally, some municipalities may merge even if they are not neighbors. This happens when 
they are a part of a coalition including multiple municipalities that jointly form a 
geographically coherent municipality.17 The resulting set of potential coalitions can be either 
used in our analysis directly or we can sample control coalitions from it.  
One practical problem in creating all potential coalitions in our application of 
municipality data is that large coalitions may take many different geographic shapes and some 
of the coalitions may be quite unrealistic. For example, some coalitions of size 6 may be 
string-like and result in high transportation costs. In order to circumvent this problem, we 
restrict the potential coalitions so that they cannot cross county borders.18  The map in Figure 
                                                 
16 Gordon and Knight (2009) make this assumption throughout their analysis while Weese (2011) is able to relax 
this assumption. Weese (2011) also shows that relaxing this assumption is important and changes his qualitative 
results.  
17 We use the FANMOD software introduced in Wernicke and Rasche (2006) to implement the algorithm. 
18 Weese (2011) faces a similar problem because the largest merger that took place during his analysis period in 
Japan included fifteen municipalities. This creates problems for Weese’s estimator because the number of 
potential coalitions with a size of fifteen or less is huge. Weese circumvents the problem in almost the same way 
as we do. He limits the analysis to coalitions that cross at the maximum two county borders. 
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A1 in the Appendix illustrates municipality and county borders. From the map, it’s clear that 
coalitions that stay within county borders (bold line) are much less likely to be problematic in 
this sense. This is a sensible restriction because none of the actual mergers crossed a county 
border. There are at least two reasons for this. First, counties constitute a middle-level in 
regional policy making in Finland even though counties have very limited political power. For 
example, all regional administrative authorities by the central government should follow 
county division. Second, county division is almost identical to hospital district division and 
every municipality has to be part of a hospital district.19 This makes counties a natural 
cooperation environment for municipalities even in the absence of formal mergers. 
Furthermore, because county border would be a perfect predictor of not merging, it would not 
be possible to use all the coalitions and simply include county border as a right hand side 
variable. Table 1 presents the number of potential coalitions of different size using the county 
restriction and the number of actual mergers. 
 
Table 1. Data frequencies and sampling weights by coalition size. 
 
 
Although not an issue in our application, in a large map with mergers involving many 
municipalities, the set of potential mergers would be too large for any computational analysis. 
Using choice based sampling the data set can be diminished to a manageable size while 
maintaining valid statistical inference. Moreover, some research questions may involve costly 
data collection and sampling could be done prior to collecting more data to limit the costs. 
                                                 
19 We also extract the counties of Kainuu and Lapland from our analysis. Kainuu County is currently 
experimenting with a county level council, and thus, the municipalities will not merge while the experiment is 
ongoing. Lapland is an outlier in the data, with large land area and low population municipalities. Therefore, 
drawing control coalitions from Lapland would result in inefficient sampling. Moreover, there were no mergers 
in Lapland during our analysis period. The map in the Appendix highlights these counties. 
Coalition 
size
Potential 
coalitions
Actual 
mergers
Control 
coalitions
WESML weights 
merger = 1
WESML weights 
merger = 0
2 785 17 340 0.45478 1.02726
3 2,175 8 160 0.07724 1.04614
4 6,561 4 80 0.01280 1.04936
5 20,674 1 20 0.00102 1.04995
6 66,606 2 40 0.00063 1.04997
All 96,801 32 640
Note: The table presents the total number of potential coalitions, the number of mergers that 
actually took place, the sampled control coalitions and the WESML weights.
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Using our data, we can verify that analyzing a choice based sample will replicate the full 
sample results.  
In choice based sampling, the basic idea is to keep all the rare events in the data as a 
treatment group. In our case, we include all the actual mergers, and then randomly sample a 
control group from the common events, which are the potential coalitions that did not 
merge.20 One way to interpret this set up is that the population of interest is the set consisting 
of all potential coalitions. Choice based sampling can be made more efficient by conditioning 
it on observed characteristics of the treatment group. Sampling conditioned on explanatory 
variables is typically referred to as exogenous stratified sampling while choice based 
sampling is an example of endogenous sampling. Combination of these two is often referred 
to as stratified choice based sampling. This sampling method has been widely applied 
especially in epidemiology with rare diseases, but it is also common in econometrics.21 Our 
sampling procedure is an extension to the existing literature on empirical spatial merger 
analysis. It reduces the computational burden dramatically and can be used in both reduced 
form and structural analysis because the statistical theory on choice based sampling is well 
developed and estimators that handle data from this type of sampling are readily available.22  
The sampling procedure is as follows. First, we select all the actual mergers into our 
sample. This type of endogenous sampling is necessary because a random sample from all 
potential coalitions would consist only of zeros with a high probability as can be seen from 
Table 1. For each actual merger in the data of size n (n = number of merging municipalities), 
we sample 20 potential coalitions of equal size that did not actually take place as controls.23 
We repeat this for all n that actually took place (in our case 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).24 Second, we 
stratify the sampling on the number of merging municipalities. Otherwise, the control group 
would consist almost only of mergers with many partners making the estimation very 
inefficient. This type of stratification is standard practice in choice based sampling.  
                                                 
20 We use the term control group to follow the terminology of case-control sampling. This does not imply any 
causal analysis as such. 
21 See e.g. Breslow (1996) and Manski (1995).  
22 See e.g. Manski and Lerman (1977), Imbens (1992) and Breslow (1996). 
23 The number of controls should be decreasing in the costs of collecting the variables of interest. In the logit 
model, as large a number as possible is preferred, since rare events correction is possible (see King and Zeng 
2001) but in some other models, a balanced smaller sample may be preferred over a larger non-balanced sample 
due to convergence issues. 
24 We omit a single merger involving 10 municipalities as an outlier and include a dummy for the coalitions in 
the county of the omitted coalition. 
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Stratified choice based sampling is prone to two sources of bias that we need to account 
for.25 First, the analysis needs to be conditioned on strata fixed effects. In our case, the strata 
groups are defined by the different number of merger partners (coalition size). Failure to do so 
results in omitted variable bias.26 Second, we need to use weights based on the sampling rates, 
which can be done by using the weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood estimator 
(WESML) proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977). WESML weights can be applied with 
any maximum likelihood estimation method and in our case the weights can be calculated 
using the numbers in Table 1.27 Within each stratum, the weights take two values (w1/p1) and 
(w0/p0), where w1 and w0 are the population proportions of merging and not merging and p1 
and p0 are the respective sample proportions.  
One of the main advantages of our procedure is that usual methods of causal inference, 
such as RDD, instrumental variables and difference-in-difference methods, can be used 
without much further complications. This is obvious for the full sample but less clear for the 
choice based sample. As an example, consider the case of RDD. Obviously, if stratification is 
not correlated with the selection into the treatment, regression discontinuity treatment effect is 
consistent. However, if stratification is correlated with the selection into the treatment the 
issue is not as clear. Let us consider the worst case scenario of perfect correlation with an 
abstract example. Assume that we stratify the sampling based on coalition population being 
under or above 20,000 and the discontinuity of interest is also at 20,000. Due to a balanced 
stratification scheme, this would result in having exactly the same relation of ones and zeros 
in the outcome variable in either side of the discontinuity threshold and on average this 
identical relation would persist near the discontinuity. If we estimated the model without 
weighting, the treatment effect would always be zero. Similar scenarios can be contemplated 
where this sort of correlation would lead to either upward or downward biased treatment 
effects. Fortunately, by using the WESML weights, the population level group effects are 
estimated consistently. Thus, even with perfect correlation between the selection into the 
treatment and the stratification, weighting allows for consistent estimation of the treatment 
effect in RDD.  
                                                 
25 See e.g. Cram et al. (2010). 
26 For example, transaction and/or negotiation costs are probably increasing in coalition size, which in turn is 
correlated with a number of observable variables of interest. In fact, in a nonlinear model stratification needs to 
be controlled for even when stratification is not correlated with observables.  
27 In STATA, this can be done either using the pweight option or the svy survey package. Imbens (1992) 
provides a more general semiparametric estimator based on the method of moments estimation. 
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4.   Data description 
 
We have linked data on municipal mergers from 2008–2009 to municipal characteristics 
obtained from Statistics Finland and to characteristics of municipal councilors obtained from 
the Ministry of Justice and the Local Government Pensions Institution. The councils in our 
data were elected in 2004 for a four year term and they made all the decisions regarding the 
mergers that took place in 2008–2009. Future mergers are decided by councils elected in 2008 
and after. The new municipal division to take place after the 2008 and 2009 mergers were 
implemented was used already in the October 2008 elections. The 2004 councils decided also 
2007 mergers but they were decided under a very different merger subsidy scheme than the 
2008–2009 mergers. By restricting the analysis to a single council and a single subsidy 
scheme, we can think of this set up as a one period coalition formation game where 
municipalities make simultaneous choices over the same map.  
Some descriptive statistics of our coalition level data are presented in Table 2, where we 
compare the actual mergers to all potential coalitions that could have merged and to our 
stratified choice based sample from this population. All council characteristics are calculated 
using 2004 election data and all coalition characteristics are based on 2007 municipality data. 
Variable definitions are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Actual mergers differ from the 
potential coalitions in a number of respects whereas the choice based sample is much more 
similar probably due to stratification. Especially striking is that actual mergers are clearly 
more likely to have cooperated already before the merger. Existing cooperation here means 
that the municipalities in the coalition had a joint authority in producing basic health care 
services, which is the largest single expenditure item for municipalities.28  
In actual mergers, the distance of the median voter to the centre of the largest 
municipality in the coalition is much lower than in all potential coalitions or the choice based 
sample. The median voter distance measure is calculated using Geographic Information 
System (GIS) techniques in the following way. We have data on the location of eligible voter 
population within 250 m * 250 m grids for the whole of Finland, which we use to calculate a 
Euclidean distance from all the grids within a coalition to the centre of the largest 
municipality in the coalition. Since we have data on the number of eligible voters in the grids 
                                                 
28 Cooperation was in place long before these mergers were contemplated. Thus, cooperation can be treated as an 
explanatory variable rather than an alternative response variable. 
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we can calculate the median distance. The population of the largest municipality is excluded 
from these calculations. The intuition is that if a merger goes through it is likely that some, if 
not all, municipal services will be concentrated into the largest municipality, and thus, the 
distance to services will grow for voters living in smaller municipalities in a given coalition. 
This is a sensible measure because any single municipality in a given coalition can prevent a 
merger. 
Actual mergers are also much less heterogeneous when compared to potential 
coalitions. In part this is due to the fact that larger coalitions are more heterogeneous simply 
because there are more municipalities involved and that large coalitions dominate our data. 
For example, the expected maximum difference in municipal characteristics is larger for 
coalition of size six than for a coalition of size three. This is obvious when one looks at the 
heterogeneity measures for the choice based sample which are much closer to the actual 
mergers.  
The importance of local politics is captured with variables that measure political 
fragmentation (the Herfindahl index), similarity of political power in different municipalities 
and party composition of the councils. Moreover, we aim to capture the importance of 
politicians’ private incentives in merger decisions with variables that measure the importance 
of both political and private career prospects. We measure political career prospects using 
three variables that are all based on municipal council size set by law. Our first variable is the 
“Reduction in council size”, which measures the relative amount of council seats lost if the 
merger goes through. The larger this variable is the more seats are lost in relative terms and it 
should capture changes in councilors’ re-election probabilities and also the relative power that 
they will have if they are re-elected into to new council. Thus, the variable measures the 
expected benefits of being a councilor if a merger goes through. However, we cannot identify 
re-election and political power considerations separately.  
In addition, we measure changes in political competition using two variables based on 
party list size. According to law, the maximum number of candidates a party is allowed to 
nominate is equal to 1.5 times the council size. Using this rule, we calculated for each 
coalition the share of both 2004 candidates and councilors that would not fit into their party’s 
candidate list if a merger goes through. That is, we measure the share of candidates and 
councilors that would not be able to run in the next elections simply because of the list size 
rule. These variables are denoted as “Party list size candidates” and “Party list size 
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councilors”, respectively. The rationale for using two variables is that councilors who decide 
the mergers may be concerned with competition that comes from insiders, that is, the current 
councilors who decide the mergers, or from outsiders, which is the pool of all candidates most 
of whom cannot vote for a merger because they are not sitting in the current council. As can 
be seen from Table 2, all these variables are clearly smaller for the actual mergers compared 
to all potential coalitions, but the differences are small between mergers and the choice based 
sample.  
Finally, we are interested whether councilors’ private career prospects matter for merger 
decisions. Being a member of a municipal council in Finland is a part-time job that incurs 
practically no salary even in the largest municipalities. However, some council members are 
municipal employees (as teachers, doctors, bureaucrats etc.), which may affect their attitude 
toward mergers, since cost savings in public service production are often put forth as the 
primary reason for mergers. The central government anticipated some resistance from 
municipal employees and enacted a transition period spanning five years after a merger during 
which municipal employees cannot be laid off due to merger-related efficiency reasons. 
Councilors’ private career prospects are captured with the variable “Municipal employees 
share in council”. This variable may, of course, also capture voter sentiments because a high 
share of municipal employees in the population could be correlated with the council share. In 
order to identify the effect of the potential merger on council member’s own career separately 
from its effect on their voters’ careers, we also include the share of municipal employees in 
the population to the model.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
5   Econometric results 
5.1   Descriptive regression results 
 
In this section, we present two sets of econometric results. The starting point for our first 
approach is the theoretical argument that municipalities seek economies of scale through 
merging but face a trade-off in terms of matching service production to more heterogeneous 
preferences of a larger population. Furthermore, we assess the role of local politics in 
coalition formation. In the second approach, we test for political agency issues using 
discontinuities in council size as our natural experiment.  
The estimation procedure is straightforward. Using the binary logit model we study 
which types of coalitions are likely to form. This approach can be seen as estimating a 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Number of observations
Average coalition size 2.84 1.17 5.55 0.78 2.84 1.15
Total population 33,882 33,546 93,695 103,554 42,191 63,647
Mean of taxable income (€) 12,208 1,594 12,164 1,612 11,719 1,742
Total expenditures (€ per capita) 5,475 521 5,604 520 5,504 557
Merger subsidy (€ per capita) 328 216 250 176 358 312
Cooperation 0.50 0.51 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.37
Median voter distance (km) 19.9 14.8 34.9 18.3 28.6 15.8
Language 0.09 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.10 0.30
Population size heterogeneity 22,329 26,789 57,994 75,623 25,449 46,751
Income heterogeneity 2,261 1,424 3,438 1,509 1,997 1,450
Tax rate heterogeneity 0.85 0.62 1.28 0.60 0.73 0.56
Expenditure heterogeneity 819 715 1,717 734 981 735
Largest municipality vote share 0.72 0.17 0.51 0.20 0.65 0.17
Herfindahl index 0.31 0.13 0.30 0.09 0.32 0.10
Same largest party 0.66 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.65 0.48
Centre Party share 0.34 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.40 0.18
Left-wing party share 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10
National Coalition Party share 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.09
Other party share 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.14
Reduction in council size 0.44 0.12 0.67 0.06 0.45 0.13
Party list size candidates 0.15 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.14 0.11
Party list size councilors 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03
Mun. employees share council 0.22 0.06 0.21 0.03 0.22 0.05
Mun. employees share population 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
640
Choice based sampleAll coalitions
96,76932
Merger = 0Merger = 1 Merger = 0
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coalition formation game in reduced form. Let yk denote the merger decision of coalition k, 
i.e. yk equals one if the coalition forms an actual new municipality and zero otherwise. The 
logit model can be written as 
 
 (1)  1 1 2 21 0 ,k k k k k ky f        x β x β z δ  
 
where 1(.) is an indicator function that equals one if the statement in the parentheses is true 
and zero otherwise. The model includes three sets of covariates along with stratification group 
fixed effects, fk. The vector x1 includes coalition characteristics (and a constant), x2 is a vector 
of variables describing coalition heterogeneity, z a vector of municipal council characteristics 
at the coalition level and k  is the usual logit error term. 
Our main results are presented in Table 3. The first model in Table 3 is a rare events 
logit model estimated using the whole data.29 The second model is a standard logit model 
using the choice based sampled data and WESML weights. These two methods are both 
consistent and should produce fairly similar results. For comparison, we also report results 
from a linear probability model estimated using OLS and the whole data. Table 4 present 
robustness results using different subsets of variables from the richest model specification in 
Table 3. All the continuous variables in the models are standardized to have a zero mean and 
a standard deviation of one. Although we have a rich set of covariates, there is always the 
possibility that we have overlooked or do not observe some important variables that drive 
merging. Since it is unlikely that all the unobservable factors driving the mergers are 
independent of the observable ones, the results should be interpreted cautiously as 
associations rather than causal effects. Possible exceptions are the merger subsidy, the 
reduction in council size and party list measures because they are exogenous step functions 
based on municipal population and we control for population and its square term directly and 
include coalition size fixed effects. However, we remain cautious in interpreting the results 
concerning these variables as causal.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 We use the Relogit command in STATA. See King and Zeng (2001) and King and Zeng (2003) for details. 
Not correcting for the rare events would result in underestimation of the merger probability. 
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Table 3. Results for rare events logit, WESML logit and OLS. 
 
 
The results are interesting in a number of ways and most importantly, the logit model 
with choice based sample data and WESML weights produces results that are consistent with 
the rare events logit results. In these two models, none of the variables have opposite signs 
with statistically significant coefficients, although some variables are significant in the rare 
events logit and not in the CBS logit and vice versa. Also the OLS results are largely in line 
with both of the logit models.  
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Constant -8.724*** 2.616 -9.556*** 2.628 0.016*** 0.005
Population -1.802 5.422 -8.569 6.009 -0.001 0.0007
(Population)2 0.413 1.115 -2.542 2.740 0.0001*** 0.00004
Mean of taxable income 0.698 0.495 0.681 0.544 0.0002 0.0003
Total expenditures 0.293 0.254 0.524 0.322 -0.00003 0.0002
Merger subsidy 0.237** 0.103 0.067 0.160 -0.0002 0.0002
Cooperation 1.313** 0.580 0.663 0.731 0.013*** 0.0043
Median voter distance -1.188* 0.638 -1.579** 0.675 -0.0002* 0.0002
(Median voter distance)2 0.270*** 0.067 0.539*** 0.186 0.0001** 0.00005
Language -0.371 0.869 -0.052 0.989 -0.0004 0.0006
Population size heterogeneity -0.711 4.798 4.054 4.938 -0.0004 0.0006
Income heterogeneity -0.085 0.342 0.306 0.562 0.00005 0.0001
Tax rate heterogeneity 0.265 0.288 1.022*** 0.365 0.00004 0.0001
Expenditure heterogeneity -0.831** 0.354 -1.315*** 0.460 -0.0002* 0.0001
Largest municipality vote share 1.707** 0.761 1.274 0.784 0.0006* 0.0003
Herfindahl index -0.358 0.346 -0.330 0.517 0.0003 0.0007
Same largest party 0.875 0.556 2.601*** 0.895 0.0008* 0.0005
Centre Party share -0.012 0.546 -0.219 0.707 -0.0007 0.0006
Left-wing party share 0.109 0.336 0.333 0.474 0.0002 0.0003
Other party share 0.132 0.245 -0.423 0.311 0.0002 0.0004
Reduction in council size -0.101 0.210 0.169 0.232 -0.00003 0.0004
Party list size candidates 0.573* 0.295 -0.223 0.469 0.0002 0.0002
Party list size councilors 1.127* 0.645 3.187*** 0.727 0.0005 0.0003
Mun. employees share council -0.047 0.145 -0.086 0.166 -0.00002 0.0001
Mun. employees share population 0.069 0.280 0.573 0.467 0.00003 0.0002
Number of obs.
Pseudo Log-L
Pseudo R2 / R2
Notes: The results are from coalition level models where the dependent variable equals one if the 
coalition actually underwent a merger. Coalition size fixed effects are included in all models. OLS standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively.  
-30.3
0.33 0.02
Rare events logit Logit, WESML OLS
96,801 672 96,801
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The results indicate that coalition population does not seem to matter, which would 
indicate that municipalities are not looking for economies of scale through merging. Median 
voter distance, on the other hand, is an important driver of merging, although the negative 
effect diminishes as distance grows.30 Existing cooperation is also important and increases the 
likelihood of merging. This a very interesting result because it indicates that merging takes 
place between municipalities that may already benefit from economies of scale in producing 
basic health care services. This casts some doubts on whether these mergers lead to increased 
cost-efficiency in service production. Furthermore, voters in cooperating municipalities are 
consuming health care services of the same quality, and thus, probably have similar 
preferences for these services. Expenditure heterogeneity is negatively associated with 
merging, which means that municipalities with heterogeneous preferences for municipal 
spending are less likely to merge. These results clearly indicate that preference heterogeneity 
is an important factor behind merging and support the predictions by Alesina and Spolaore 
(1997). Somewhat surprisingly though, coalition level mean income and within coalition 
income heterogeneity are not statistically significant. The central government merger subsidy 
gets the expected positive sign but it is statistically significant only in the rare events logit.  
Next we turn to results concerning politics. At coalition level, political parties do not 
seem to matter. All the party share variables, the Herfindahl index and the same largest party 
are not statistically significant in the rare events logit, although the same largest party is 
positive and significant in the WESML logit. These results are not very surprising because in 
Table 3 we are controlling for heterogeneity in expenditures and tax rates directly and it can 
be argued that variables based party shares also reflect voter preferences. Furthermore, these 
results remain unchanged even without heterogeneity measures as can be seen from Table 4. 
Interestingly, the vote share of the largest municipality gets a positive sign and is statistically 
significant. It may be that councilors of larger municipalities who are elected in more 
competitive elections, value future political careers more than councilors of smaller 
municipalities while these smaller municipalities are more often forced to merge for economic 
reasons.  
The results so far suggest that municipal councilors’ actions are in line with voter 
preferences. What about the variables measuring political and private career concerns? 
Reduction in council size is not statistically significant. However, the party list size variables 
                                                 
30 For a large majority of the data, the negative effect clearly dominates. 
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that measure political competition get a positive sign and are statistically significant at 10 
percent level. In fact, the p-value for the Party list size councilors is 0.052 and they are jointly 
significant at 5 percent level. Once we control for the reduction in council size these variables 
have a clear interpretation as measures of political competition related to re-election. The 
result means that coalitions with lower political competition are more likely to form. The 
share of municipal employees in council does not seem to matter for merging.   
 
Table 4. Additional rare events logit results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant -5.144*** 1.165 -7.194*** 1.736 -7.341*** 1.940 -5.045*** 1.196
Population -0.566 0.983 -7.729 4.873 -2.367 1.275
(Population)2 -0.457 0.915 -1.335 0.978 0.200 0.985
Mean of taxable income 0.422 0.384 0.643 0.464 0.445 0.386
Total expenditures 0.218 0.165 0.426** 0.190 -0.011 0.241
Merger subsidy 0.037 0.170 0.061 0.158 0.232* 0.123
Cooperation 1.538*** 0.513 1.351*** 0.490 1.356** 0.558
Median voter distance -0.775 0.510 -1.028** 0.512 -1.013* 0.593
(Median voter distance)2 0.253*** 0.061 0.292*** 0.058 0.264*** 0.066
Language -0.215 0.677
Population size heterogeneity 5.978* 3.497
Income heterogeneity -0.097 0.338
Tax rate heterogeneity 0.165 0.253
Expenditure heterogeneity -0.796** 0.348
Largest municipality vote share 1.543*** 0.435 0.829*** 0.280
Herfindahl index -0.300 0.314 0.361 0.283
Same largest party 0.790 0.559 0.607 0.521
Centre Party share 0.076 0.570 -0.361 0.555
Left-wing party share 0.195 0.364 0.208 0.404
Other party share 0.163 0.247 -0.037 0.276
Reduction in council size -0.088 0.195 -0.053 0.187
Party list size candidates 0.604** 0.289 0.103 0.306
Party list size councilors 0.961 0.621 0.746 0.534
Mun. employees share council -0.012 0.149 0.071 0.145
Mun. employees share population 0.017 0.252 -0.401** 0.171
Number of obs.
Notes: The results are from coalition level models where the dependent variable equals one if the coalition actually 
underwent a merger. Coalition size fixed effects are included in all models. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
Rare events logit Rare events logit Rare events logit Rare events logit
96,801 96,801 96,801 96,801
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5.2   Council size RDD results 
 
As we argued above, the reduction in council size and party list measures are exogenous step 
functions based on municipal population and as such the results may be interpreted as causal 
since we are controlling for population with second order polynomial. However, as an 
additional test for political agency issues we perform an RDD analysis using discontinuities in 
council size as our natural experiment. The problem in using these discontinuities is that a 
number of things change at the thresholds and it is impossible to identify which of the 
channels produces the possible treatment effect. However, even in this case RDD can be used 
to determine whether the simultaneous treatments have a significant joint effect and whether 
some of the effects dominate others.  
If the total population in a new merged municipality lands just above a population 
threshold, there are more seats available and re-election is easier. If re-election is important 
for the councilors, they should favor mergers that happen to land just above a threshold over 
mergers that land just below. On the other hand, if councilors prefer power per capita (or 
councilor) over more certain re-election, they may favor mergers just below a threshold. Thus, 
the treatment affects both the probability of re-election and the benefits of office conditional 
on being re-elected, and these two effects should have the opposite sign.  
Crossing the population threshold also affects the number of candidates that each party 
is allowed to nominate in the next elections because the size of the party list is limited to 1.5 
times the council size. This limit is typically not binding in smaller municipalities but it is 
binding in larger ones. In particular, in coalitions with a large population or many merger 
partners, this rule significantly limits the number of candidates that parties can nominate if a 
merger goes through. As a result, incumbent councilors face more competition in the next 
elections if the new coalition is above a population threshold, and thus, if incumbents care for 
re-election, they should prefer coalitions just below the threshold. RDD based on the council 
size rule only identifies the joint effect of three simultaneous treatments, two of which have 
opposite effects on re-election probabilities, and one with a positive effect on the benefits of 
office conditional on re-election.31 The fact that the council size rule implements 
simultaneous treatments also means that council size thresholds cannot be used as 
instrumental variables because we would have more endogenous variables than instruments.  
                                                 
31 Only council size and maximum party list size change at the threshold. The test for balance of other covariates 
around the thresholds does not dispute this. 
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Some concerns have been raised recently, by e.g. Ade and Freier (2011), about the 
validity of using population thresholds in RDD. In addition to the discussed problem of 
simultaneous exogenous treatments, they point out two other typical issues and show that all 
three invalidate some existing published research.32 First, additional endogenous choices on 
other institutions are often taken simultaneously to the response of interest. In our case, no 
other decisions are made simultaneously to the merger. Second, manipulation and precise 
control over population measures would invalidate the experiment. In our set up, the 
manipulation of population statistics would be very costly for the municipalities because this 
information is gathered independently by the Central Government. 33 Moreover, the potential 
‘manipulation’ of resulting true population of the realized mergers is the variable of interest 
for us.  
Due to a small number of realized mergers in our data, we are forced to use parametric 
RDD and the identification of the treatment effect depends on the correct specification of the 
forcing variable. We include many polynomials of population in the regression and test for 
robustness of the results with respect to changing the number of polynomials. Furthermore, 
we alleviate this identification assumption by comparing means only near a threshold by 
including both a dummy for a band around the threshold and a treatment dummy indicating 
that the observation is above and near a threshold. We test for robustness with respect to the 
size of the band as well. Since the council size rule has multiple discontinuities we average 
over the treatments at different thresholds by including only one treatment and band dummy 
in each regression. Furthermore, we use the actual population as the forcing variable instead 
of distance to the nearest threshold. This is important because we have such a small sample of 
mergers and we do not want to compare coalitions just below a population threshold of 2,000 
to those just above a 250,000 threshold for example.  
In addition to a merger RDD we also report regressions that illustrate the effect of 
crossing a threshold on our political career variables used in the descriptive regressions. Thus, 
we run regressions of the type: 
 
(2)  0 1 2 ,k k k k k ky band treat g pop f          
 
                                                 
32 E.g. Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010). 
33 We also conducted tests for manipulation of the forcing variable. According to the McCrary test, our 
experiment seems to be valid. 
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where yk is the outcome in question (merging or one of the political career variables), bandk is 
an indicator for whether coalition k is within a bandwidth of any threshold and treatk  is an 
indicator for whether coalition k is within a bandwidth and above any threshold. The function 
g(popk) is a high order polynomial of coalition population and fk denotes coalition size fixed 
effect.  
The results are presented in Table 5. First, it is clear that the council size treatment 
effect for all the variables related to political agency issues is large and significant. These 
results confirm that RDD based on the council size rule is a good natural experiment for the 
joint impact of these variables. The result also validates the argument above that the council 
size thresholds cannot be used as instrumental variables. However, we do not find any 
significant effects of crossing the threshold on merger activity. The result is robust to different 
band sizes and number of polynomials.34 Thus, we are not able to confirm that political 
agency issues are relevant for the merger activity. On the other hand, we cannot reject their 
possible influence either. Naturally, some caution is in order because the estimates are not 
extremely precise in all cases. Again that the RDD results from the rare events logit model are 
similar to the WESML logit model using the choice based sampled data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The results are robust to band sizes of 10 %, 15 %, 20 % and 25 %, and 0–7 polynomials of coalition 
population. Smaller bandwidths are not feasible due to limited amount of actual mergers around the thresholds.  
The results are also robust to adding control variables.  
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Table 5. Council size RDD results. 
 
 
6   Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzed empirically the coalition formation of local governments. We introduced 
a novel econometric strategy involving choice based sampling from a spatial network to 
handle multi-partner mergers and applied the method to recent municipality mergers in 
Finland. We analyzed coalition formation using logit analysis where a coalition consisting of 
two or more municipalities is used as the observation unit. Our main interest was the 
association of local politics with merger decisions, a clear gap in both the empirical and 
theoretical literature on local government coalition formation. The most interesting aspects of 
our analysis in this respect are the role of the geographic location of the median voter in a 
potential coalition, which we can measure quite precisely using a GIS dataset produced by 
Forcing variable polynomials Squared Cubic Quartic Squared Cubic Quartic
Window size 15 % -0.637*** -0.648*** -0.652*** -1.645*** -1.645*** -1.669***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Window size 20 % -0.522*** -0.539*** -0.545*** -1.379*** -1.377*** -1.403***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.132) (0.134) (0.133)
Window size 15 % -0.596*** -0.593*** -0.583*** -0.758*** -0.746*** -0.755***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
Window size 20 % -0.499*** -0.497*** -0.487*** -0.576*** -0.565*** -0.575***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Window size 15 % -0.280*** -0.307*** -0.344*** -0.103** -0.106** -0.108**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Window size 20 % -0.284*** -0.322*** -0.364*** -0.055 -0.058 -0.059
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Window size 15 % 0.060 0.048 0.027 0.029 -0.339 -0.377
(0.528) (0.529) (0.525) (0.525) (0.730) (0.678)
Window size 20 % 0.155 0.138 0.116 0.117 -0.176 -0.204
(0.466) (0.468) (0.470) (0.470) (0.628) (0.596)
Notes: The regressions for council size and party list variables are estimated using OLS. Merger 
regressions are estimated using rare events logit and WESML logit. Standard errors are reported in 
the parentheses. In the OLS regressions, the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. All 
regressions include coalition size fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively.  
All data, N = 96,801 CBS, N = 672
Reduction in council size
Partry list candidates
Partry list councilors
Merger
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Statistics Finland, and political agency issues related to re-election, political competition and 
politicians’ private careers. The former can be seen as a measure of voter preferences over 
merging while the latter measures departure from optimality in coalition formation due to 
politicians’ self-interest. If political agency considerations matter, optimal coalition formation 
may be hindered further from the majority voting result presented by Alesina and Spolaore 
(1997). We also studied how different municipality characteristics and heterogeneity in these 
characteristics within a potential coalition are associated with merging.  
The main result from our analyses is that the councilors’ decisions are largely in line 
with voter preferences. Mergers are clearly less likely when the distance of the median voter 
to the coalition centre is large. Also within coalition per capita expenditure heterogeneity was 
negatively associated with merging while existing cooperation in producing basic health care 
services clearly increased merging. Interestingly, coalition population was irrelevant to 
merging indicating that municipalities do not seem to be seeking economies of scale through 
merging. However, the local political environment has a role in merger decisions. Councilors 
seem to be concerned over re-election and prefer mergers where post-merger political 
competition is lower. This result is based on an exogenous council size and party list size rule 
based on municipal population and it is difficult to come up with a credible story where this 
result would reflect voter sentiments in any way. This means that local political environment 
may hinder the formation of optimal coalitions. Our results imply that theoretical and 
empirical work on coalition formation that abstracts away from political decision making 
process and decision makers’ motives may be too simplistic.  
The results also raise the question of which government level should make the decisions 
concerning mergers. One option is that the central government should force mergers even 
without the approval of the municipality councils. However, there are some obvious caveats 
to this. First, information requirements for the central government to form optimal coalitions 
are large. Second, it may not be politically feasible. Third, it is not clear that the central 
government decision makers do not have private incentives at stake.  
Besides providing important information on coalition formation mechanisms in general, 
our application of municipal mergers should be of practical interest to countries with a 
multilayer system of government. There have been a number of recent examples of 
municipality mergers, such as in Germany and Japan in the late 1990’s and 2000’s and in 
Denmark in 2007. In all these cases, the merger decisions were mostly made at the local level. 
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Furthermore, the results serve as a first step in evaluating whether municipality mergers are 
an effective way of meeting the ultimate goal of the central government, which is to make 
municipal service production more efficient. For example, the finding that existing 
cooperation in basic health care is an important factor driving merger decisions could mean 
that a merger does not produce large efficiency gains because economies of scale are already 
exhausted through cooperation. However, we leave these issues for further research.  
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Appendix. Additional figures and tables. 
 
 
Figure A1. Map of municipality mergers in 2008–2009. 
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Table A1. Variable description. 
 
 
 
 
 
Average coalition size Average number of municipalities in a coalition.
Total population Total population of the coalition.
Mean of taxable income (€) Coalition level mean taxable income.
Total expenditures (€ per capita) Total municipal expenditures per capita at coalition level.
Merger subsidy (€ per capita) Central government merger subsidy per capita.
Cooperation Dummy that equals 1 if all municipalities in the coalition organize 
basic health care through a joint authority, zero otherwise.
Median voter distance (km) Median euclidian distance of voters to the centre of the largest 
municipality in the coalition. Centre corresponds to the location of 
the city or town hall. The voters of the largest municipality are 
excluded. Voters' location is based on 250 m x 250 m grids. 
Language Dummy that equals 1 if at least one municipality in the coalition is 
classified in a different language class than others in the coalition, 
zero otherwise. There are four different classes: unilingual Finnish, 
unilingual Swedish, bilingual with a Finnish speaking majority and 
bilingual with a Swedish speaking majority.
Population size heterogeneity Maximum population - Minimum population.
Income heterogeneity Maximum mean income - Minimum mean income.
Tax rate heterogeneity Maximum municipal income tax rate - Minimum municipal income tax 
rate.
Expenditure heterogeneity Maximum expenditure per capita - Minimum  expenditure per capita.
Largest municipality vote share (Number of votes given in the largest municipality in the coalition in 
the 2004 elections)/(All votes given in the coalition)
Herfindahl index Standard Herfindahl index based on coalition level party shares. 
Coalition party shares are calculated by simply adding up all 
councilors in a coalition.
Same largest party Dummy that equals 1 if all municipalities in the coalition have the 
same largest party, zero otherwise.
Centre Party share The share of the Centre Party at coalition level.
Left-wing party share The share of left-wing parties (Social Democrats and Left Alliance) at 
coalition level.
National Coalition Party share The share of the National Coalition Party at coalition level.
Other party share The share of other parties at coalition level.
Reduction in council size Relative reduction in overall council seats if the merger goes through.
Party list size candidates The share of 2004 candidates that would not fit into a party list if the 
merger goes through.
Party list size councilors The share of 2004 councilors that would not fit into a party list if the 
merger goes through.
Municipal employees share council The share of council members who are employed by the municipality 
sector.
Municipal employees share population The share of municipal employees in the population.
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